| 000 | 01230cam a2200169 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250121114001.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aMartimort, David _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Sand-Zantman, Wilfried _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aEnvironmental Agreements |
| 260 | _c2014. | ||
| 500 | _a52 | ||
| 520 | _aThis article proposes a perspective on international climate agreements, based on mechanism design. We exhibit a trade-off between incentives and participation. We derive a general condition under which the first-best allocation can be implemented. We then discuss how this condition is affected by the assumptions on the status quo, in particular whether a non-cooperative or a grandfathering solution prevails when the negotiation fails. We show that, when the feasibility condition is satisfied, a market-based solution can indeed implement the first best allocation. At last, when the condition does not hold, we characterize the main properties of the second-best solution. Classification JEL : Q54 ; D82 ; D62. | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue économique | 65 | 4 | 2014-06-12 | p. 481-497 | 0035-2764 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2014-4-page-481?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c546191 _d546191 |
||