000 01555cam a2200253 4500500
005 20250121114047.0
041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aGilboa, Itzhak
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Minardi, Stefania
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Samuelson, Larry
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Schmeidler, David
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aStates and Contingencies: How to Understand Savage without Anyone Being Hanged
260 _c2020.
500 _a41
520 _aModels of decision-making under uncertainty gain much of their power from the specification of states so as to resolve all uncertainty. However, this specification can undermine the presumed observability of preferences on which axiomatic theories of decision-making are based. We introduce the notion of a contingency. Contingencies need not resolve all uncertainty, but preferences over functions from contingencies to outcomes are (at least in principle) observable. In sufficiently simple situations, states and contingencies coincide. In more challenging situations, the analyst must choose between sacrificing observability in order to harness the power of states that resolve all uncertainty, or preserving observability by working with contingencies. JEL Codes: D8.
690 _acontingencies
690 _auncertainty
690 _apreferences
690 _astates
690 _achoice
786 0 _nRevue économique | 71 | 2 | 2020-02-18 | p. 365-385 | 0035-2764
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2020-2-page-365?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c546380
_d546380