| 000 | 01223cam a2200229 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250121114118.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aForges, Françoise _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aCorrelated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information |
| 260 | _c2023. | ||
| 500 | _a45 | ||
| 520 | _aAumann [1974] introduced the correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for games in strategic form. Aumann [1987] showed that if players are Bayes rational (i.e., maximize their individual expected utility with respect to their beliefs) and share a common prior, their actions follow a correlated equilibrium distribution. Various extensions of the correlated equilibrium have been proposed for games with incomplete information. This paper provides a brief account of them. JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83. | ||
| 690 | _abayes rationality | ||
| 690 | _astrategic equilibrium | ||
| 690 | _ainformation structure | ||
| 690 | _abayes rationality | ||
| 690 | _astrategic equilibrium | ||
| 690 | _ainformation structure | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue économique | 74 | 4 | 2023-11-20 | p. 529-539 | 0035-2764 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2023-4-page-529?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c546484 _d546484 |
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