000			01281cam a2200169 4500500
005			20250121114138.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aMoschetto, Bruno-Laurent _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Teulon, Frédéric _eauthor
245	0	0	_aThe Linear Voting Rule Limitation Strategy to Reduce the Power of a Unique Newcomer over a Firm’s Capital
260			_c2015.
500			_a16
520			_aThis paper studies the rules that limit voting rights as a defensive measure against hostile takeovers. We consider atomistic shareholders and a small group of united minority shareholders, the hard core, that wants to block any hostile takeovers. This group constructs a device based on a threshold below which each share is linked to one vote and above which each share gives less than one vote, according to a coefficient of redistribution. It finds the optimal couple that blocks hostile takeovers while minimizing the negative impact on the market due to too strong protection of the hard core to the detriment of dispersed shareholders.Classification JEL : G18, G30, G34
786	0		_nRevue économique | 66 | 6 | 2015-10-21 | p. 1067-1088 | 0035-2764
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2015-6-page-1067?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c546554 _d546554