000			01641cam a2200169 4500500
005			20250121114207.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aBazart, Cécile _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Bonein, Aurélie _eauthor
245	0	0	_aThe Strength of the Symbol
260			_c2017.
500			_a1
520			_aStarting from the observation of taxpayers’ heterogeneity in terms of honesty and of the existence of a perverse social dynamic leading the most honest to evade, we propose a simple mechanism to restore honesty. In a laboratory experiment, we test the willingness of subjects to voluntarily contribute to a fund dedicated to finance the fight against tax evasion. This voluntary contribution mechanism, without redistribution, is analyzed thanks to several treatments that differ depending on the type and the level of the required contribution. We show: 1) that a substantial number of subjects contribute and that the frequency of contribution decreases with the increase in the level of contribution; 2) that the most honest taxpayers are those who contribute; and 3) that risk aversion deters subjects to contribute, while inequality aversion encourages them. Finally, in line with the literature on tax evasion, we confirm that the increase in the audit probability, which is observed only in groups where the collective contribution is sufficient, reduces evasion in these groups. Classification JEL : H26, C91, C72, D03, D6.
786	0		_nRevue économique | o 5 | 5 | 2017-08-31 | p. 829-841 | 0035-2764
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2017-5-page-829?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c546686 _d546686