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| 005 | 20250121114317.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aLanglais, Éric _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aCompensation for Damages and the Frequency of Litigation in the Context of Information Asymmetry on Risk Aversion between Parties |
| 260 | _c2008. | ||
| 500 | _a31 | ||
| 520 | _aThis paper examines the effect of information asymmetry on risk aversion between opposing parties in litigation, within a Bebchuck-type model. We will firstly analyze the case where the plaintiff is the informed party, by specifying the equilibrium with or without negotiation prior to the legal proceedings. We will then examine the model’s comparative statics, as well as the effect of the type of rule in place for paying out legal expenses. Lastly, we will discuss several extensions: the case in which the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the representation of litigants’ preferences, and the presence of comparative optimism bias or self-serving bias. | ||
| 690 | _alitigations | ||
| 690 | _aasymmetric information | ||
| 690 | _abias in risk perception | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRecherches économiques de Louvain | 74 | 2 | 2008-06-02 | p. 191-218 | 0770-4518 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2008-2-page-191?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c546736 _d546736 |
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