000 | 01786cam a2200229 4500500 | ||
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005 | 20250121114318.0 | ||
041 | _afre | ||
042 | _adc | ||
100 | 1 | 0 |
_aLarré, Françoise _eauthor |
700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Plassard, Jean-Michel _eauthor |
245 | 0 | 0 | _aWhat Role Do Incentives Play in the Management of Teaching Staff? |
260 | _c2008. | ||
500 | _a37 | ||
520 | _aIn the era of the knowledge and learning economy, education has become a major issue and the teacher now plays a central role as a key variable in educational production. We will examine the methods used for boosting teachers’ performance in order to improve school results. Incentives such as performance-related pay for teachers are frequently recommended as a means of improving teachers’ performance and educational outcomes in schools, but the empirical evidence to date on its effectiveness is mixed. This paper offers a review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on how incentives affect teachers’ behaviors. We will examine the arguments for and against teacher incentives. In particular, we will look at i) the difficulties in monitoring and evaluating teachers’ performance, ii) the issue of teamwork in the context of rewarding individual teacher performance, and iii) the problem of multi-tasking when only some duties are quantified and incentivized. JEL Classification: I21, I28, J33, J45, M52. | ||
690 | _ateacher incentives | ||
690 | _agroup and individual incentives | ||
690 | _amulti-tasks | ||
690 | _aevaluation | ||
690 | _aperformance pay | ||
786 | 0 | _nRecherches économiques de Louvain | 74 | 3 | 2008-10-27 | p. 359-403 | 0770-4518 | |
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2008-3-page-359?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
999 |
_c546742 _d546742 |