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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aExbrayat, Nelly
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Gaigné, Carl
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Riou, Stéphane
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aTrade Integration and the Destination of Subsidies
260 _c2010.
500 _a56
520 _aIn this paper, we will develop a model of trade and localization, with two countries which differ in productivity levels. Public spending has two possible outcomes: a direct subsidy to immobile households or a wage subsidy to mobile firms. We will show how at the subsidies equilibrium, the country with the higher level of productivity provides firms with a lower after-tax subsidy. Despite this less generous policy, the former country can host a larger share of firms such that its total spending can be higher than in the low-productivity country when trade costs are low enough. Welfare analysis suggests that the second-best optimum requires an increase in subsidy to households in both countries when the economies are weakly integrated, or that the productivity gap is low, and alternatively, a significant portion of capital owners reside outside both economies.
690 _atrade integration
690 _apublic expenditure composition
690 _afirm location
786 0 _nRecherches économiques de Louvain | 75 | 4 | 2010-01-21 | p. 407-423 | 0770-4518
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2009-4-page-407?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c546761
_d546761