000			01617cam a2200265 4500500
005			20250121123735.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aDeront, Eva _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Evrard, Aurélien _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Persico, Simon _eauthor
245	0	0	_aHow to keep a campaign promise without fulfilling it
260			_c2018.
500			_a44
520			_aThis article analyses the (non-)implementation of a campaign promise to shut down the Fessenheim nuclear power plant during President François Hollande’s term. This case study allows us to test the central hypothesis of this issue, namely that the fulfilment (or not) of an election pledge depends on both the capacity and incentives that political leaders have to honour their promises. Two main arguments are proposed. First, the nature of a promise and the circumstances under which it is made condition its fulfilment. Second, political actors can modulate their ability to keep promises. While, in this case, the executive branch was quickly faced with unanticipated sectoral constraints, it was able to exploit these constraints to reformulate and postpone an electoral promise that had been made reluctantly.
690			_aelectoral pledges
690			_acampaign promises
690			_aFessenheim
690			_aenergy policy
690			_apublic policy
690			_anuclear
690			_aFrance
786	0		_nRevue française de science politique | 68 | 2 | 2018-05-22 | p. 265-289
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2018-2-page-265?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c561014 _d561014