| 000 | 01492cam a2200229 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250121125711.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aMarty, Frédéric _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aThe Criteria of Consumer Welfare as the Exclusive Objective of Competition Policy. A Perspective on the Basic History of American Antitrust Policy |
| 260 | _c2015. | ||
| 500 | _a16 | ||
| 520 | _aAccording to the European Commission competition law, enforcement has to be based on an effects-based approach on the American antitrust model. The logic underlying this approach should lead to maximizing consumer welfare must be the exclusive criterion, according to the prescriptions of the Chicago School. Here, we consider the history of the American antitrust policy in order to analyze how this model has become predominant and demonstrate that alternative criteria, such as distributive justice or the control of private economic power, have been or may still be chosen to compete with the consumer welfare approach. JEL Codes: K21, L12, B13, N12 | ||
| 690 | _acompetition policy | ||
| 690 | _aefficiency | ||
| 690 | _amarket power | ||
| 690 | _aU.S. Antitrust | ||
| 690 | _adistributive justice | ||
| 690 | _aconsumer welfare standard | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue internationale de droit économique | XXVIII | 4 | 2015-04-28 | p. 471-497 | 1010-8831 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2014-4-page-471?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c566068 _d566068 |
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