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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aChauviré, Christiane
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aThe Tractatus and sciences
260 _c2022.
500 _a33
520 _aIn the Tractatus, the early Wittgenstein sustained a philosophy of science marked with conventionalism and verificationism grounded in the “logic of Abbildung.” But he developed no scientistic ideology. By 1929 there was a grammatical turning point in his philosophy: the grammar of science contains not only logical laws, but the theoretical portion of natural sciences. The grammar of science sees large theories (Copernicus, Darwin, Freud) as “synoptic views” gathering many phenomena, such as Kuhn’s paradigms, for instance. This does not prevent Wittgenstein from being a realistic philosopher (in the sense of Cora Diamond) with a strong verificationism about states of things. The last part of this article tries to appreciate, along with Wittgenstein, the differences and relationships between science and philosophy in contemporary naturalism.
690 _aphilosophy of science
690 _aWittgenstein
690 _anaturalism
690 _aTractatus Logico-Philosophicus
690 _arealism
690 _aCora Diamond
690 _aphilosophy of science
690 _aWittgenstein
690 _anaturalism
690 _aTractatus Logico-Philosophicus
690 _arealism
690 _aCora Diamond
786 0 _nRevue internationale de philosophie | o 300 | 2 | 2022-07-08 | p. 57-72 | 0048-8143
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2022-2-page-57?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c568254
_d568254