000			01398cam a2200157 4500500
005			20250121133008.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aLe Lannou, Jean-Michel _eauthor
245	0	0	_aRepresentation of the mind
260			_c2021.
500			_a98
520			_aDespite the ample emancipation of the power of thought operative in Léon Brunschvicg’s work, we must acknowledge that the liberation he is seeking remains incomplete. Why is this so? This is the question that this article addresses. The article begins by showing what restrictive modalities the life of consciousness confronts. The two unresolved stumbling blocks—the identification of thought and consciousness, and the identification of the “us” and the “for us”—come directly from Brunschvicg’s implicit resumption of the Aristotelian tradition. In a real ambiguity, Brunschvicg denounces certain Aristotelian theses, but takes up others, in fact the most fundamental ones. The article ends by sketching the conditions of a real rupture with neo- Aristotelianism, and defines what the liberation of the thinking power really means as a way of exceeding representation.
786	0		_nRevue de métaphysique et de morale | o 111 | 3 | 2021-05-31 | p. 337-352 | 0035-1571
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-metaphysique-et-de-morale-2021-3-page-337?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c573327 _d573327