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_aDolbeault, Joël _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aMind as a Physical Force: Popper’s Metaphysical Hypothesis |
| 260 | _c2013. | ||
| 500 | _a87 | ||
| 520 | _aWith respect to the mind-body relation, Popper rejects physicalism, as defined by the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, and attempts to build an interactionist hypothesis that would agree with the findings of contemporary science. More precisely, Popper criticizes the most elaborate forms of physicalism because they run counter to evolutionary theory and rationalism. By contrast, he thinks that the interactionist hypothesis can find support in a minute comparison of mind and physical forces. This comparison tends to draw Popper closer together with panpsychism. | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger | Volume 138 | 4 | 2013-11-06 | p. 505-526 | 0035-3833 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-philosophique-2013-4-page-505?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
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