000			01394cam a2200205 4500500
005			20250121134147.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aMeylan, Anne _eauthor
245	0	0	_aAssessing self-deception: Butler, Clifford, and contemporary philosophy
260			_c2018.
500			_a35
520			_aThis paper attempts a reconstruction of part of the history of the philosophical discussion that has focused, within the English-speaking world, on the issue of self-deception, a topic that has underwent a noticeable revival among epistemologists in the last two decades. More precisely, this contribution bears on the issue as to why self-deception spontaneously appears to be blameworthy, something one ought not do, and whether such a value judgement is always well-founded, both epistemologically and morally. This questioning results in a conceptual and normative investigation, which pays attention to beliefs in general, and irrational beliefs in particular, as they are essentially related to reasons and justifications.
690			_airrational beliefs
690			_aself-deception
690			_aButler
690			_aClifford
786	0		_nRevue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger | Volume 143 | 3 | 2018-08-28 | p. 357-370 | 0035-3833
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-philosophique-2018-3-page-357?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c575870 _d575870