000 01687cam a2200169 4500500
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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aMarty, Frédéric
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Pillot, Julien
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aOn the Application Criteria of the Essential Facilities Theory within the Framework of European Competition Policy
260 _c2011.
500 _a71
520 _aThe essential facilities doctrine (EFD) involves antitrust liability for a dominant firm, when an access refusal to one of its asset could exclude an actual or a potential competitor from the market. First used for network industries’ infrastructures, the EFD was progressively extended to intangible assets, as intellectual property rights, as Magill, IMS or Microsoft cases show it. The European practices sharply contrast with US Antitrust positions. Mandatory access decisions could induce significant adverse effects on investment incentives for both dominant firm and its competitors. In order to assess such risks, we analyzed in this paper the criteria used in the European competition case law. We highlight the potential consequences of their ambiguity and their subsequent plasticity. We consider that such characteristics could be both analyzed in terms of legal uncertainty, in terms of legal resources for corporate strategies or in terms of additional room for competition authorities’ discretional interventions
786 0 _nReflets et perspectives de la vie économique | Volume L | 4 | 2011-12-23 | p. 197-221 | 0034-2971
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-reflets-et-perspectives-de-la-vie-economique-2011-4-page-197?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c577005
_d577005