000			01399cam a2200217 4500500
005			20250121184409.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aLipiansky, Edmond-Marc _eauthor
245	0	0	_aCritical Analysis of Assumptions of Cognitivism
260			_c2008.
500			_a72
520			_aIn the 80s, the study of subjective identity, as expressed by the notion of Self, become an important subject matter for American experimental cognitive psychology. In this field, scientific research focuses mainly on models and methodology of information processing as applied to the study of the Self. Despite various inconsistencies, they rely on basic assumptions this article aims to elucidate. The article offers a critical analysis that relies on an approach that finds its inspiration in phenomenology and the resulting existential psychology. It concludes that phenomenology’s framework seems more appropriate in accounting for the notion of subjective identity than that of cognitivism, the latter tending to obsess over methodology at the expense of epistemological thinking.
690			_aself
690			_acognitivism
690			_ainformation
690			_aIdentity
690			_acommunication
786	0		_nConnexions | o 89 | 1 | 2008-06-11 | p. 47-61 | 0337-3126
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-connexions-2008-1-page-47?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c649832 _d649832