Taxe environnementale et incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte (notice n° 836667)
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| fixed length control field | 02341cam a2200265 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250123140831.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Ouattara, Kadohognon Sylvain |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Taxe environnementale et incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2018.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 76 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Cet article analyse la taxation des émissions de pollution sur un marché où une entreprise semi-publique est en concurrence avec une entreprise privée (nationale ou étrangère). Nous supposons que les propriétaires des firmes engagent un gestionnaire à qui ils délèguent les décisions de production et d’abattement de la pollution. Nous montrons que la politique environnementale est plus sévère dans le duopole mixte national que dans le duopole mixte international. De plus, parce qu’elle conduit à une augmentation de la quantité totale produite dans l’industrie, la délégation engendre une hausse de la taxe environnementale et dégrade la qualité de l’environnement. Par ailleurs, les gouvernements peuvent utiliser la politique environnementale comme un substitut à la privatisation. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Environmental tax and managerial incentives in a mixed duopolyThis paper examines the environmental policy of governments in a market where a semi-public firm competes with a private firm. According to the private firm nationality (domestic or foreign), we analyse the influence of strategic managerial delegation upon the pollution tax. We show that the environmental policy is more stringent with a domestic private firm. We also show that the optimal emission tax is always higher in the presence of delegation, regardless of private firm’s nationality. Finally, governments can use environmental policy as a substitute for public firm privatization.Classification JEL : L13, L33, Q58, D21. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | privatisation partielle |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | taxe environnementale |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | duopole mixte |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | incitations managériales |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | mixed duopoly |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | partial privatization |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | environmental tax |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | managerial incentives |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue économique | 69 | 5 | 2018-09-06 | p. 723-744 | 0035-2764 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economique-2018-5-page-723?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economique-2018-5-page-723?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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